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Abstract
Despite the constant and frequent merger activity across various industries in the U.S. and
throughout the world, limited evidence of the success of corporate mergers has been documented.
The vast body of academic research demonstrates that most mergers add no value or reduce
shareholder value for the acquiring firm. Furthermore, the traditional merger theories have not
found significant empirical support. In the past twenty years, more behavioral explanations have
been utilized to provide a theoretical basis for merger activity. The “hubris hypothesis” (Roll,
1986) was one of the first non-rational motivations offered to explain corporate merger activity.
More recently, overconfidence and optimism have come to the forefront as the most common
behavioral explanations for the continued prevalence of ill-advised mergers. This paper suggests
that a different type of behavioral bias may also influence merger and acquisition decisions -
confirmation bias. Using a unique experimental data set, we provide evidence in support of the
existence of confirmation bias in merger decision making behavior. (JEL: G340)
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1 Introduction
In regard to corporate mergers, repeated analyses by academics, management consultants, and in-
vestment bankers have reached the same conclusion. In the short-term to medium-term, fewer than
half of all mergers add value.1 Additionally, one study reported that less than 30% of companies
found that their M&A transactions achieved their stated objective within the planned time frame.2
The shareholders whose company is bought end up richer, while the shareholders of the buyer sel-
dom do. Although merging is not always a mistake, it is quite risky. Historically, merger activity
has been difficult to rationalize in terms of traditional finance theory. However, in the past twenty
years, more behavioral explanations have been utilized to provide a theoretical basis for merger ac-
tivity. Roll (1986) was first to propose a non-rational motivation for corporate merger activity with
the “hubris hypothesis.” More recently, overconfidence and optimism have come to the forefront
as the most common behavioral explanations for the continued prevalence of ill-advised mergers
(Malmendier & Tate, 2005). “Excessively optimistic and overconfident executives press on with an
acquisition, even when the reaction in financial markets is negative.”3 However, this paper presents
evidence of a different type of behavioral bias that may also influence merger and acquisition deci-
sions - confirmation bias. Using experimental methods, this paper examines merger and acquisition
decision making behavior and provides evidence in support of the presence of confirmation bias.
The existence of a confirmation bias in the merger and acquisition decision making process could
have implications for developing CEO compensation plans. Typically these executive compensation
plans are designed to tie compensation with firm performance for the purpose of eliminating agency
problems. However, evidence of a behavioral bias that would interfere with an executive’s ability to
properly evaluate investment opportunities may or may not be adequately addressed with current
compensation schemes. As demonstrated by Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) and others, the
explanations for the level and structure of CEO compensation have significant policy implications.
1Economist (1999)
2Solving the Merger Mystery: Maximizing the Payoff of Mergers and Acquisitions : Deloitte Consulting (2000)
3Shefrin (2006), p. 162.
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Correspondingly, the type of biases and behaviors that affect executive decision making should
influence the design of compensation plans. The existence of these biases may also have significant
implications for the enforcement of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 which is used to hold executives
accountable for corporate malfeasance.
1.1 Determinants of Corporate Merger Activity
1.1.1 Traditional Theory
Financial theory tells us that the value of any asset is equal to the present value of its cash flows.
In that context, a publicly held firm is merely a bundle of cash flows expected to be received in the
future. Under the standard assumption that investors diversify to hold the market portfolio, merger
activity does not necessarily add shareholder value. Mergers simply combine the rights to cash flows
that are already held by diversified investors; investors who should be indifferent between receiving
future cash flow streams from two separate firms or from one merged firm formed by combining
them. Nonetheless, several major, non-mutually exclusive reasons are typically offered to explain
merger activity (Bower, 2001; Warshawsky, 1987): limit competition and/or gain market share;
extend product line; expand geographically; wrest corporate control from entrenched, inefficient
management in order to realize greater profitability; gain tax advantages; exploit inefficiencies in
the financial markets that leave corporate equities undervalued relative to their intrinsic worth.
In terms of a more rigorous theoretical basis for merger activity, there are a number of diverse
theories. We know that modern finance theory is predicated on several assumptions that hold only
as approximations in financial markets. Transaction costs, agency costs, informational asymmetries,
taxation, and government regulation are all assumed away in most financial models. The presence
of these and other market frictions could create situations in which mergers theoretically have the
potential to create shareholder value. These theoretical explanations can be grouped into five major
categories: microeconomics, financial distress, capital markets, taxation, economic shocks.
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Microeconomics - Industrial organization theory offers the most straight-forward explanation.
Simply put, mergers allow firms to acquire varying degrees of monopoly power, permitting them to
increase cash flows by raising prices. In terms of production theory, there are several mechanisms
through which a merger could increase shareholder value. Mergers could add value by generating
economies of scale, economies of scope, or efficiency gains.
Financial Distress - Incorporating the cost of financial distress into financial theory also generates
an additional rationalization for merger activity. In actual financial markets, especially in industries
like financial services with stringent solvency regulation, firms face significant financial distress
costs. Firms that are excessively leveraged or in a weak financial condition, incur higher regulatory
costs and potential operating restrictions (Cummins & Weiss, 2004). In the 1970s, Lewellen (1971)
advanced the co-insurance idea that the joining together of two firms whose earnings streams
were less-than-perfectly correlated would reduce the risk of default of the merged firm and thereby
increase the “debt capacity” or “borrowing ability” of the combined company. Thus, the increased
total borrowing capacity of the resulting firm provided an economic incentive for shareholder-
wealth-maximizing firms to engage in a merger. Lewellen’s thesis did not carefully examine the
impact of the co-insurance effect on the value of the merging firm’s already outstanding debt.
However, Kim and McConnell (1977) did find evidence that was consistent with the argument that
a co-insurance effect did exist and that the wealth transfers to bondholders that would have been
generated were negated by the increased use of debt financing.
Capital Markets - Inefficient capital markets is another theory offered to explain merger activity.
In the 1980s, Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1989) found that the abnormal returns in tender offers4 are
related to the Tobin’s q ratios (ratio of market value of a firm to replacement cost) of the targets and
the bidders. They found that target, bidder, and total returns are higher when takeover targets have
high q ratios and bidders have low q ratios. Servaes (1991) analyzed over 700 merger and tender
offers between 1972 and 1987 to confirm the results of the work by Lang et al. and to show that their
4Public offer to purchase stock at a specified price per share. The bid price is generally at a price above the market
price and is usually done to gain a controlling interest in a corporation.
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findings also hold for mergers and hold after controlling for other determinants of takeover gains.
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) use the Q-Theory of mergers to argue that mergers are a channel
through which capital flows to better projects and better management. Informational asymmetries
between managers and capital markets tend to make capital markets inefficient in allocating capital
among alternative uses and thus may lead to higher costs of capital. Managers are said to be able
to use their superior knowledge of the firm’s investment opportunities to allocate capital efficiently
among projects, thereby maximizing firm value. More recently, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) have developed models in which mergers and acquisitions
are driven by stock market valuations or more precisely “misvaluations”.
Taxation - Corporate income taxation provides a mechanism for increasing net cash flows through
mergers. Firms can reduce expected taxes by reducing earnings volatility to the extent that corpo-
rate tax schedules are convex or to the extent that they can exploit inter-country tax arbitrage or
utilize tax loss carryovers (Cummins & Weiss, 2004).
Economics Shocks - Based on empirical analysis of the 1982-1989 period, Mitchell and Mulherin
(1996) assert that the waves of merger activity within industries are driven by economic shocks to
industry structure such as deregulation. Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) also support this
conclusion with an analysis of merger data from the 1990s.
1.1.2 Empirical Evidence of Merger Success
Corporate mergers usually have episodic occurrences across industries within the United States and
around the world. Notwithstanding the previous theoretical explanations, the empirical evidence
suggests on average that little to no short-term or medium-term benefits and limited long-term
benefits are achieved from merging. Hogarty (1970) found that performance of heavily merging
firms to be generally worse than the average investment performance of firms in their respective
industries. Additionally, he found mergers to have a neutral impact on profitability. Lev and
Mandelker (1972) could not point to any clear effect of merging on riskiness of the acquiring firm,
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growth rate in the post-merger years, financial structure, percentage of income taxes paid, or
liquidity position of the acquiring firm. Haugen and Langetieg (1975) also found that mergers fail
to produce economically significant changes in the distribution rates of return to the stockholder.
Firth (1979) studied mergers and takeovers in the United Kingdom and found that on average there
were no gains associated with takeovers and that there were in fact small losses.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) claimed that mergers and acquisitions create social welfare by al-
lowing the most efficient distribution of corporate assets. They reported that successful acquiring
firms earned average risk-adjusted excess returns of 3.8% with acquisitions and approximately 0%
with mergers.5 However, these results were challenged by a flood of event studies finding negative
returns to the shareholders of acquirers during the 1970s and 1980s (Sirower, 1997). Generally,
these studies demonstrated that the mean returns to acquirers pursuing acquisition strategies were
significantly negative, with only approximately 35% of acquisitions being met with positive stock
market returns on announcement (Sirower, 1997). Even Jensen and Ruback (1983) revealed that
as the event window expanded, the returns to acquiring firms deteriorated significantly.
More recently, Cummins and Weiss (2004) conducted a market model event-study of mergers
and acquisitions in the European insurance industry over the period 1990-2002. They found that
European mergers and acquisitions created small negative cumulative average abnormal returns for
acquirers and substantial positive cumulative average abnormal returns for targets. Additionally,
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) examined a sample of 12,023 acquisitions by public firms
from 1980 to 2001 and found that shareholders of these firms lost a total of $218 billion when
acquisitions were announced. Most merger event studies find that, in the long-term, acquiring
firms are found to experience negative abnormal returns (Scherer, 1988).
Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1989) offered risk reduction as another explanation for merger
activity. However, when they empirically tested the hypothesis, they found no evidence in their
sample that risk reduction for the acquiring firm is the typical outcome or that when it occurs it
5Based on a relatively short event window of no more than one month before and one month after announcement.
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is differentially costly for the shareholders. Some recent papers do find some positive effects from
mergers (See Pillof, 1996; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998; Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, & Zulehner, 2003;
Ramaswamy & Waegelein, 2003). However, overall the empirical results generally show a negative
long term impact on profitability.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 establishes the basis of our behavioral
explanation and discusses the significance of merger integration costs. Section 3 discusses our
experimental study. Section 4 presents our experimental data and results. Section 5 provides
concluding remarks.
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2 Behavioral Explanations
Most of the reasons put forth to explain merger activity lack a definitive theoretical basis and the
empirical evidence of post-merger performance has been inconsistent at best. While the traditional
theories in the merger literature are disparate, they do have two commonalities. The explanations:
1) are based on the idea that the merger decision is a rational action and 2) fail to explain completely
the empirical outcomes observed.
Along slightly different lines, Roll (1986) suggested hubris as a motive for corporate takeovers
and mergers. “Hubris on the part of individual decision makers in bidding firms can explain why
bids are made even when a valuation above the current market price represents a positive valuation
error. Bidding firms infected by hubris simply pay too much for their targets.” Empire building
and overconfidence are the prominent behavioral theories that have been put forth. We accept
these arguments as a partial explanation but explore the possibility that they may be acting in
combination with other behavioral biases.
The focus on integration costs associated with recent high profile merger disasters suggests that
there may also be biases with respect to the evaluation of merger integration costs. For example,
Quaker Oats Company’s $1.7 billion purchase of Snapple Beverage Corporation in late 1994 stands
as one of the worst acquisitions of the 1990s. While the acquisition had a number of issues, the
costs associated with integration often were cited as one of the primary reasons for its failure.
Still bleeding from its acquisition last year of Snapple, the Quaker Oats Company
warned Wall Street today that earnings in the quarter ending Dec. 31, 1995 would fall
short of expectations. Quaker also announced plans for a $40 million pre-tax charge
against earnings in the quarter, mostly to cover the cost of getting rid of overca-
pacity in Snapple’s bottling operations.6
6“Still Drained by Snapple, Quaker Sees a Big Charge” by Barnaby J. Feder, The New York Times - Dec. 22,
1995
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Merger Integration Costs
Ex ante, savings and synergies not integration costs and restructuring costs are the focus of
most mergers. However, as in the previous example, ex post integration costs are often cited as
the reason for the failure of specific mergers. “......technology integration can often cost more than
expected and undermine the purpose of a merger.”7 Thus, we start by quantifying the magnitude
of recent direct merger integration and restructuring costs.8
Mergers with substantial integration costs, like the Snapple merger, are not isolated incidents.
When reviewing the cumulative direct integration costs9 of the top twenty mergers since 1998, we
see that integration costs can be non-trivial10 (See Table 1). When evaluating a sample of all U.S.
company mergers over $5 billion between 1990 and 200411, we confirm that integration costs are
considerable. Yearly restructuring costs as large as 15% of net revenue could be found. Upon a
closer examination of average restructuring cost, we see that even five years after any given merger,
the acquiring firm on average still realizes restructuring expenses. Four years after a merger, average
costs are higher than the year immediately after the merger (See Figure 1).12 Thus, our data show
that the integration and restructuring costs are a significant and recurring expense associated with
mergers. Consequently, any biases in assessing these costs could have profound effects on merger
decisions.
7“The Lack of Standards is a Massive Headache” by Philip Manchester, Financial Times - Mar. 13, 2002, p. 16.
8While we focus on direct costs, in addition to the direct costs associated with merger integration, there are also
indirect costs associated with the ability to manage human capital.
9Direct integration costs information obtained from acquiror annual reports. For mergers after 1998, number
reflects the sum of all integration costs identified in annual reports from year of merger through 2004. For mergers in
1998, number reflects the sum of all integration costs identified in annual reports from year of merger through 2003.
10Rank value and deal value estimates obtained from the Thomson Financial database. Rank value is calculated
by subtracting the value of any liabilities assumed in the transaction from the transaction value and by adding the
target’s net debt. Net debt is straight debt plus short-term debt plus preferred equity minus cash and marketable
securities as of the date of the most current financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction.
11Using the Securities Data Corp. (SDC) database, we first compiled a list of all mergers over $5 billion be-
tween 1990 and 2004. After deleting internationally based companies, we also purged our list of any transaction
that was not a true merger but was a buyback, recapitalization, restructuring, or acquisition by a private equity
firm/investor group/management team. Additionally, we eliminated from the sample all acquiring firms that had
multiple acquisitions over any five year period. Total final sample includes 51 companies.
12Based on a subsample of our data so that four years after restructuring can be observed. Subsample contains 20
companies and covers mergers occurring between 1990 and 1999.
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Figure 1: Average Restructuring Costs as a Percent of Net Revenue, 1990 - 1999
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3 Experimental Study
Given the anecdotal and empirical evidence linking the failure of many mergers to integration issues
and costs, what can we learn from an experimental study in this area? Similar to Croson, Gomes,
McGinn, and No¨th (2004), this paper uses experimental methods to examine questions involving
mergers and acquisitions. An experimental approach enables us to rule out many behavioral ex-
planations such as empire building and “no information availability” bias and to focus on cognitive
reasons. Thus, the experimental data may help to shape the behavioral literature on merger theory.
3.1 Discussion of Approach
Several methodologies have been employed to determine how decision-makers use information in
the process of making decisions - called process tracing (Russo, 1977). The most prominent of
these process tracing techniques involves monitoring the acquisition of information throughout the
decision process (See Payne, Braunstein, & Carroll, 1978, for a review of various techniques.) Typ-
ically, information is hidden but labelled by topic. A subject is then allowed to access information
as they wish, before making a decision. The experimenter tracks the information that is accessed,
the order in which it is accessed, and the time spent on each topic. This is then related to the
decision that is made and the data are analyzed for statistical patterns and significance.
3.2 Process Tracking Experiment
To empirically test our theory that corporate executives exhibit biases with respect to integration
cost information, we use a process tracing methodology to track the decision making behavior in
two separate experiments conducted in an experimental economics laboratory. We obtain data on
what information subjects seek, in what order the information is acquired, how much information
is acquired, and for what duration is the information examined. (For experiment instructions see
Appendix A.1)
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Procedure
In an experimental economics laboratory at an ivy league university, subjects were presented a
series of three case studies accessed through the use of an internet browser. For each case study,
the first page presented to the subject would place the participant in some decision making capacity
at a firm considering the acquisition of another firm.13 A general description of the activities of
these firms, and the potential motivation for the merger was given. At the bottom of the page
was a list of hyper-linked pages labelled Competition and Market Share, Financials, Integration
Issues, Legal and Regulatory Considerations, Operating Synergies, Acquiring Company Informa-
tion, Target Company Information, Tax Ramifications, and Proceed to Final Decision. (For an
example, see Appendix A.2) Clicking each information link would bring the individual to another
page containing information on the relevant topic. Going back to the original page (to access other
information or make a final decision) required the subject to reveal their current intention as to
whether the firm should carry out the merger or not. Clicking on the link labelled “Final Decision”
lead subjects to a page where they would recommend one of three options: i) submit a [high $] bid
to acquire the company, ii) submit a [low $] bid to acquire the company, iii) do not bid. Subjects
were informed that if they selected the [low $] bid option, then there was only a 0.5 probability of
acquiring the company.
The case studies were designed to draw attention to various aspects of a potential merger. For
example, one case considered firms that operate in separate geographic regions, where merging may
not allow firms to cut many jobs or shut down facilities. A sample case appears in Appendix A.2
Further, we designed the case studies to mimic the types of case studies typically presented in job
interviews or MBA classroom exercises. Thus, the format was familiar to all of the subjects.
With each of the three cases, subjects were presented with one of four different “treatments”:
i) high integration costs and high savings from operating synergies, ii) high integration costs and
low savings from operating synergies, iii) low integration costs and high savings from operating
13All acquisitions are to be made using stock.
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synergies, iv) low integration costs and low savings from operating synergies. The cases were
presented to each individual in random order. Case versions and treatments were randomized
using the same process.
Subjects were informed that the computer would track the order in which they accessed infor-
mation, the time spent on each page, as well as the intermediate and final decisions for each case.
Following the three case studies, subjects were asked a short series of questions regarding their
experience and the importance of the information they used.
Subjects
Two types of subjects were used in this experiment: business undergraduates and business execu-
tives.14 The first group consisted of 55 undergraduate business majors at an ivy league university.
The second group consisted of executive practitioners: CEOs (4), presidents (5), senior vice presi-
dents (1) and other senior executives (5) of large companies. The executive subjects were recruited
as they attended a meeting of the alumni of the same ivy league university as the undergraduate
subjects. It is important to note that the this paper has better control over the subject pool than
many other experiments using both professionals and students (See for example, Burns, 1985; Fehr
& List, 2004; Haigh & List, 2005). The executive subjects were alumni of the same university and
department as the student subjects.
Subject Payments
After a final decision in a case, the student subjects would be awarded points equal to the net
present discounted profit realized from either the merged or non-merged company (calculated from
the information in the case study). In addition, from the intermediate choices selected, the stu-
dent subjects were awarded one-half the average points that would have resulted from making the
corresponding final decision.15
14The composition of our subject pool is similar to Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989) who using both students and
business executives find “similar results are reported almost without exception across” the two groups.
15This is done to make intermediate decisions incentive compatible.
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The first round was played as a practice round, with subjects informed of their point totals,
but not receiving any money or other compensation. Subjects were informed that they had seven
minutes for each case to provide a final decision or no points would be awarded. In each of the two
other cases, student subjects were paid $5 plus approximately $2 for every 100 points earned in the
experiment.
The executive subjects received the same information as those in the student subjects. Following
Fehr and List (2004), we were concerned with offering rewards that were substantial enough for the
executives to take the game seriously. Fehr and List overcame this problem with Costa Rican CEOs
by scaling the incentives up by a factor greater than ten for CEOs as compared to students. With
a group of CEOs and other officers of large US companies, we felt the level of monetary rewards
that were possible to offer to any individual would not achieve our objective. Since the amount
of money we could provide as incentive for the executive subjects was not likely to be salient, no
monetary rewards were given. Rather, prior to participation, it was announced that point totals
would be announced by name to all participants with the participant obtaining the highest point
total receiving a university alumni director’s chair (valued over $400) and the participants with the
next four highest point totals receiving coffee table books. Post experimental debriefings suggest
that the executives took the experiment very seriously, and desired to do well.
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4 Data and Results
4.1 Data Overview and Summary Statistics
There were a total of 2,333 decisions observations from the two experiments. 2,034 of the total
observations were from student subjects while 299 of the total observations were from executive
subjects. Executives were less likely to decide in favor of a merger (See Table 2). However, evidence
suggests that this was not due to risk aversion. We see that executives did not “display risk
aversion”16 significantly more than students (See Table 3). With a p-value of 0.9475, the difference
in means test confirms that there was no evidence of a difference in “displaying risk aversion.” A
higher percentage of the students did exhibit more “risk seeking”17 than the executives (See Table
4). However, the difference in means test indicates that there also was little evidence of a difference
in risk loving. While we cannot reject the null that the means are the same, the p-value of 0.5127
does caution us that this could be due to a sample size issue.
16Displayed risk aversion being defined as giving up expected value to reduce risk. Given choices A and B, where
A had a weakly lower expected value than B but lower risk, choice A is a risk averse choice. Choice B is inconclusive.
17Displayed risk seeking being defined as giving up expected value to increase risk. Given choices A and B, where
A had a weakly lower expected value than B but higher risk, choice A is a risk loving choice. Choice B is inconclusive.
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Table 2: Subject Decisions
Number of
Final Decision Obs.
% Did Not Bid % Bid Low Price % Bid High Price
Students 165 24% 46% 30%
Executives 45 40% 42% 18%
Table 3: Subject Performance - Displayed Risk Aversion
Displayed Risk Aversion Students Executives
Yes 30% 31%
No 70% 69%
Table 4: Subject Performance - Displayed Risk Seeking
Displayed Risk Seeking Students Executives
Yes 53% 42%
No 47% 58%
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4.2 Decision Making Results
4.2.1 Subject Information Seeking and Evaluation
Executives reviewed an average of 20 information pages prior to making a final decision, while the
students reviewed 37 (85% more) information pages before making a final decision. This was not
due to any sort of time constraint since, on average, the executives spent less total time per case
(269 seconds) than the students (283 seconds). Generally, the maximum time allowed per case (7
minutes) was not a binding constraint for any of the subjects.
Conditional on visiting the operating synergies page, executives spent approximately the same
average amount of time reviewing the operating synergies information (Executives - 7.9 seconds;
Students - 7.0 seconds). Conditional on visiting the savings page executives spent approximately
the same average amount of time reviewing the savings information (Executives - 41.1 seconds;
Students - 38.2 seconds). Difference in means tests reveal that both of the differences in student
and executive average times are not significant (p-value of 0.41 for the operating synergy page and
a p-value of 0.41 for the savings page).
While we see that the executives and students reacted to synergy and savings information
similarly, that is not the case with integration issues and cost information. The main differences
in the behavior of the executives and students come with respect to the integration issues and cost
pages. Conditional on visiting the integration issues page, executives spent much less time than
students reviewing the information (Executives - 31.7 seconds; Students - 40.9 seconds). A difference
in means test indicates that this difference is significant with a p-value of 0.02. Conditional on
visiting the cost page, executives and students spent approximately the same amount of time
(Executives - 24.3 seconds; Students - 27.0 seconds, p-value of 0.52).
Executives and students had similar page visitation patterns except with respect to the integra-
tion issues, cost, competition, and target company financials information (See Figure 2). The most
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Figure 2: Page Visitation Patterns
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Table 5: Integration Issues and Costs
% that did NOT look at integration issues % that did NOT look at costs
Students 6.7% 18.8%
Executives 28.9% 51.1%
striking differences are with the integration issues and cost page visitation between executives and
students. While 93.3% of the students visited pages pertaining to integration issues, only 71.1% of
executives visited the integration issues pages. Additionally, 81.2% of the students visited the cost
pages with only 48.9% of the executives looking at any cost related information before making a
final decision (See Table 5). The fact that fewer executives visited the integration issues and cost
pages has big implications when we consider that whether or not a subject reviewed a particular
piece of information had ramifications for how the subject bid.
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4.2.2 Decision Changes
In the total sample, several pages influenced subjects to change from a no bid to a yes bid (See
Figure 3). Yet, when comparing the differences between students and executives we see that many
different pages influenced students to change from a no bid to a yes bid but the savings page was the
chief influence for executives (See Figure 4). The cost page was the primary page that influenced
both students and executives to change from a yes bid to a no bid (See Figure 5). However, if we
look beyond the cost pages when comparing the differences between students and executives, we see
that executives were more influenced by the acquiring company’s information and financials while
students were more influenced by the target company’s financials (See Figure 6).
In addition to fewer types of pages influencing executives to change their decisions, we also
observed that executives were less likely than students to change their decisions at all. The prob-
ability density of decision conditional on previous decision shows that executives had more inertia
in their decision making and had fewer big swings (See Table 6, Figure 7, & Figure 8).
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Figure 3: Pages Which Caused Subject to Change from a No Bid to a Yes Bid - Total
Sample
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Figure 4: Pages Which Caused Subject to Change from a No Bid to a Yes Bid
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Figure 5: Pages Which Caused Subject to Change from a Yes Bid to a No Bid - Total
Sample
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Figure 6: Pages Which Caused Subject to Change from a Yes Bid to a No Bid
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Table 6: Probability Density of Decision Conditional on Previous Decision
Previous Decision
Total Sample Executives Students
Decision $100m Bid $75m Bid No Bid $100m Bid $75m Bid No Bid $100m Bid $75m Bid No Bid
$100m Bid 66% 14% 4% 88% 9% 2% 63% 14% 5%
$75m Bid 25% 72% 23% 12% 76% 11% 27% 72% 27%
No Bid 8% 14% 72% 0% 15% 88% 10% 14% 68%
Figure 7: Probability Density of Decision Conditional on Previous Decision - Executives
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Figure 8: Probability Density of Decision Conditional on Previous Decision - Students
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Table 7: Confirmation Bias Characterization
If Subject: Then Subject:
Views Integration Issues Views Costs Bids Exhibits Confirmation Bias
No No Yes Yes
No No No Yes
Yes No Yes Yes
Yes No No No
Yes Yes Yes No
Yes Yes No No
4.3 Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias is generally described as a situation in which an individual attaches too much
importance to information that supports his views relative to information that runs counter to his
views (Shefrin, 2006). While much of the research on confirmation bias focuses on the scrutiny
applied to new information, evidence suggests the problem is much deeper. Confirmation bias also
determines the type of information individuals seek. In the context of our experiment, we define
confirmation bias as a subject not seeking additional information which could potentially change
the final decision. The data suggest that a significant majority had a predisposition to go with the
merger at the beginning of each case. Consequently, we examine the data for evidence of avoiding
negative/disconfirming information with respect to the merger (i.e., integration issues and cost
information). Table 7 summarizes how we define subject confirmation bias.
Using the characterization provided in Table 7, we find that 40.0% of the executive decisions
involved confirmation bias with respect to integration issues and cost information compared with
only 17.6% of the student decisions. Thus, the executives were less likely to change their decisions
and less likely to review information that had the greatest potential to affect the final decision. We
take these results as strong evidence of the existence of confirmation bias in the executive subjects.
The different decision making processes between executive and student subjects also produced
different results. When scores were calculated based on the net present discounted profit realized
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from either the merged or non-merged company, the average performance of the student subjects
was better than that of the corporate executives (See Table 8). This is further illustrated by a
graph of the the cumulative distribution functions of executive and student scores which reveals
that the students scores nearly first order stochastic dominated the executive scores except for
around the mean score (See Figure 9). This result, while somewhat surprising, is consistent with
other experimental findings. For example, Haigh and List (2005) documented that professional
traders exhibited stronger behavioral biases that student subjects. In an experimental setting they
found that the investment behavior of professional traders was consistent with myopic loss aversion
to a greater extent than student subjects.
Given the strong experimental evidence in support of the existence of a confirmation bias in the
next subsection, we suggest a theoretical confirmation bias model which may help us to describe
and better understand merger and acquisition decision making behavior.
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Table 8: Subject Performance - Score
Score
Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min
Students 374 59 366 516 263
Executives 349 51 376 419 258
Figure 9: Cumulative Distribution Functions of Executive and Student Scores
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4.4 Theoretical Confirmation Bias Model
Ross and Anderson (1982) describe how confirmation bias can lead to the persistence of false beliefs.
Lord, Lepper, and Ross (1979) show that given an initial set of beliefs, individuals will tend to
take new information confirming their beliefs as beyond question, while subjecting disconfirmatory
information to intense scrutiny. Such a process would lead individuals to become more and more
certain of whatever initial belief they have. We will call this process verification.
In terms of confirmation bias influencing the type of information individuals seek, Wason (1968)
gives a simple illustration of this effect in which a subject is shown four cards with ‘E,’ ‘K,’ ‘4,’
and ‘7’ written on the exposed face. Subjects are told that each card has a letter written on one
side, and a number written on the other side. Further, the subjects are given a hypothesis to test:
Every card with a vowel on one side has an even number on the other side. Subjects are then asked
which cards must be turned over to test the hypothesis. Most respond that ‘E’ and ‘4’ should be
turned over. Turning over the ‘E’ and finding an odd number would disconfirm the hypothesis.
However, turning over a ‘4’ and finding a consonant would provide no information. Turning over
the ‘4’ could only provide confirming evidence (as would turning over the ‘E’ and finding an even
number). Alternatively, almost no subjects think to turn over the ‘7.’ Turning over the ‘7’ and
finding a vowel would provide disconfirming evidence, while finding a consonant would provide
no information regarding the hypothesis. Thus, it appears individuals will seek any information
that is possibly confirming, while shunning information that can only disconfirm prior beliefs or
individuals do not understand contra positives. We will refer to this behavior as selection bias.
When a potential merger arises, new information must be sought concerning the profitability
to the acquiring firm regarding the merger. Much like the hypothesis from Wason’s study, all
information is sought to answer a specific question, “Should we acquire Company X ?” Asking the
question in this way naturally delineates nearly all information into the categories of positive (or
possibly confirming) and negative (or possibly disconfirming) information. Items dealing with the
costs of integrating the new firm are closely associated with not going through with a merger, while
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information regarding the potential savings and synergies are closely associated with executing the
merger.
Given a set of mutually exclusive potential transaction research requests (or what are more
commonly called message services in the information economics literature) S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, the
decision-maker must determine which to pursue based on prior information in order to make the
merger decision. The standard economic solution to this problem would suggest that the decision
maker maximize his expected utility of profit, using Bayesian updating.18 Consider the simple
case where the decision-maker can either decide to “merge” and receive profit equal to Πr with an
accompanying probability distribution or “not merge” and receive the certain amount Π. Let the
probability distribution of Πr be given by:
f(Πr) =
{
ph if Πr = Πh > Π
pl if Πr = Πl < Π.
(1)
where r = h (high) or l (low), and pr is the true probability of Πr occurring.
Let the prior probability of high and low profits be given by pih and pil respectively. Let the
potential messages returned by message service i be given by m1i ,m
2
i , . . . ,m
T
i , with respective
probabilities q1i , q
2
i , . . . , q
T
i . Let φ(m
i
j) be the likelihood of receiving message j from message service
i given Πr. Thus, the expected utility of message service i would be given by:
EUΠr =
J∑
j=1
qij max
{
pihφ(mij |Πh)
qij
U(Πh) +
pilφ(mij |Πl)
qij
U(Πl), U(Π)
}
. (2)
A message service creates value by altering the perceived probability of high or low profit
resulting from the merger, thus increasing the probability of a larger profit resulting from the
merger choice. If, for example, the prior probabilities suggested going ahead with the merger, the
average value of a signal (in terms of the standard utility model) would be given by
V (si)=
∑J
j=1 q
i
j
∥∥∥∥max{pihφ(mij |Πh)qij U(Πh) + pilφ(mij |Πl)qij U(Πl), U(Π)
}
−
{
pihφ(m
i
j |Πh)
qij
U(Πh) +
pilφ(m
i
j |Πl)
qij
U(Πl)
}∥∥∥∥.
(3)
18Hirshleifer and Riley (1992), p. 170 - 178.
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The model in 3 suggests that value can only be created if the resulting behavior changes. However,
confirmation bias suggests that this is not the case. Rather, individuals add value by confirming
the decisions they have made prior to obtaining the information. Thus, we propose the following
behavioral model of confirmation bias
V (si) =
J∑
j=1
qij
∥∥∥∥∥max
{
pihφ(mij |Πh)
qij
U(Πh) +
pilφ(mij |Πl)
qij
U(Πl), U(Π)
}
− {pihU(Πh) + pilU(Πl)}
∥∥∥∥∥.
(4)
Here, value is created where the posterior probabilities disagree with the prior probabilities.
All informational outcomes are compared to the (potentially false) distribution of outcomes en-
compassed in the prior. Thus, information increasing the possibility of a positive outcome from
a decision, but not changing the decision, will result in increased value. Further, the process of
verification makes it such that any signal that disagrees with the prior information (or the favored
answer) will be discounted or ignored. Thus, let the decision-maker learn according to a form of
the generalized Bayes rule (e.g. Grether, 1980) called the limited learning model (Just, 2001). The
perceived probability of Πr occurring is p(Πr|mij) =
pirφ(mij |Πr)k(pih−νh)
qij
, where νh =
φ(mij |Πh)
φ(mij |Πh)+φ(mij |Πl)
is the normalized likelihood and k ∈ [0, 1] is a geometric weight given to the likelihood information
as a function of the geometric distance between the prior and the normalized likelihood (so that
νh + νl = 1) of the favored outcome. Let k(·) be monotonically decreasing in its argument, so that
the lower the difference between prior probability of the high profit and the probability suggested
by the information signal, the more the signal is interpreted as a uninformative signal (where k = 0
implies the individual interprets the likelihood function as a uniform distribution, conveying no new
information). In other words, k is the weight given to new information and is a function of the type
(confirming or nonconfirming) of information. When comparing the value of message services, the
signals that receive the lowest weight k will also convey the least value, as it does not change the
posterior probabilities. Thus, message services that are likely to contradict the prior probability
are the least likely to be chosen, while those that confirm beliefs are the most likely to be chosen.
Consequently, selection bias is a natural consequence of verification behavior.
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When we transform equation 4 into its normalized likelihood form where νilj = 1−νihj , we have:
V (si) =
J∑
j=1
qij
∥∥∥∥∥∥max
pih(νihj)
k(pih−νihj)
Bij
U(Πh) +
pil(1− νihj)k(pih−ν
i
hj)
Bij
U(Πl), U(Π)
− pihU(Πh)− pilU(Πl)
∥∥∥∥∥∥.
(5)
where Bij = pih(ν
i
hj)
k(pih−νihj) + pil(1 − νihj)k(pih−ν
i
hj) is the Bayes’ factor for contingent j of signal
i, and νihj is the normalized likelihood of event h given signal j of service i. Let the decision be
such that if the perceived probability of a high outcome falls under p¯, then the individual decides
to take Π.
Proposition 1: Let s1 and s2 be two message services each with two possible messages: ν1h1 =
ν2h1 = pih, ν
2
h2 < ν
1
h2 < pih, and q
1
1 = q
1
2. Then, message service 1 will be weakly preferred to signal
2 if ν1h2 <
1
2 and if
∂k(pih−ν)
∂ν is below a specified bound.
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If there are two message services, each with two possible messages that arrive with equal probabil-
ities, service one having a confirming and a disconfirming message (synergy information), service
two having a confirming (identical to service one) and a more severely disconfirming message (cost
information), the service that has the less severely disconfirming service will be preferred. This
will always be the case if the probability of success in the severely disconfirming case is below 12
and if disconfirming information is sufficiently discounted. (Proof is contained in Appendix B.1.)
Proposition 2: Let s1 and s2 be two message services each with two possible messages: ν1h1 =
ν2h1 = pih, ν
2
h2 < pih, and q
1
1 > q
1
2. Then, message service 1 will be strongly preferred to signal 2.
If there are two message services, each providing the same two possible messages (one confirming
and one disconfirming), then the message service with the higher probability of the confirming
message will be preferred. (Proof is contained in Appendix B.2)
When evaluating mergers, our conjecture is that executives exhibit a sort of selection/confirmation
bias. Within the context of a merger, cost information may be thought to have greater potential
19Bound defined in proof found in Appendix B.1
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to disconfirm the merger, while information on savings may more likely confirm the merger. Thus
we expect individuals will regard cost and savings information very differently depending on their
prior inclination toward the merger.
5 Concluding Remarks
There is strong evidence that executives seek and evaluate merger information differently from
non-executives. Executives review fewer pages of information than students and they are less likely
to change their minds after reviewing new information. Since we observe that the student subjects
reviewed 85% more pages of information than executive subjects, there is initial evidence to support
a search cost story. (i.e., Executives have higher search costs and thus search less for information
in general.) However, we observe that the executives specifically ignore integration issues and cost
information relative to our student subjects. Given that the experimental setting creates a situation
where all search costs are equivalent, a pure search cost story would not fully explain the results.
While executives and non-executives seem to access and evaluate the operating synergies and
savings information similarly, the most striking differences between executives and non-executives
come with respect to the integration issues and cost pages. For example, over 80% of the students
accessed the integration cost information while over 50% of the executives made a final merger
decisions without even looking at any associated cost information. This asymmetry is our strongest
evidence of a confirmation bias when it comes to integration cost information. Consequently, as
was shown by Rabin and Schrag (1999), “an agent may with positive probability come to believe
with near certainty in the wrong hypothesis.” Our data also show that this executive confirmation
bias generates sub-optimal decisions. That fact that the executives perform worse than the student
subjects, supports our assertion that confirmation bias could lead to misguided merger decisions
and is consistent with the general evidence that most mergers generate long run negative abnormal
returns for the acquiring firm.
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Appendix
A Business Case: MediProd, Inc.
A.1 General Subject Instructions
You are now taking part in an economics experiment designed to study the decision making pro-
cess of individuals participating in merger and acquisition decisions. At any time you wish, you
may decide to withdraw from the experiment. Simply raise your hand and instruct our assistant.
Throughout this experiment, you will be awarded points based on your own decisions and may win
a prize based on your point total. The computer will record each of the links or buttons that you
press and the time that you press it. Please do not converse with other subjects, or attempt to
obtain information from their actions. We also ask that you do not write during the experiment.
While you will each be asked to perform similar tasks, the order and some parameters of these tasks
may be substantially different. In each of three rounds, you will be brought to a screen describing
your position in a firm considering the acquisition of another firm, and some of the fundamental
reasons behind this potential acquisition. We will call this screen the Main Page. Also, on the Main
Page will be links to various types of information that may or may not be useful in making the
acquisition decision. The information links. Will include: competition/market share information,
company information, financials, integration issues, legal & regulatory issues, operating synergies,
and tax ramifications.
From the Main Page you can follow any number of the information links you like in any order to
obtain the corresponding information. Following an information link will bring you to a page briefly
describing some pertinent information and two buttons: ‘Return to Main Page’ and ‘Make a Final
Decision’. If you select ‘Return to Main Page’, you will first be directed to an Intermediate Decision
Page where you will be required to click on a button indicating the decision you would make should
you be barred from receiving any more information. If you select ‘Make a Final Decision’, you will
be prompted to click on a button corresponding to your final decision. If you select ‘CANCEL’ on
the Make a Final Decision Page, you will first be directed to the Intermediate Decision Page before
being returned to the Main Page.
In each round you will have a maximum of 7 minutes to view the information links. The computer
will begin counting down from the time you reach the Main Page for that round. If at the end
of 7 minutes you have not recorded a final decision you will automatically be brought to the final
decision screen (although without a ‘CANCEL’ button). In rounds one and two after you have
made a final decision, you will be brought to a screen reporting your score for the round and
displaying a button labeled ‘NEXT’. Pressing the ‘NEXT’ button will begin the next round and
bring you to the Main Page for that round.
In each round points will be awarded based on the short term (4 years) flow of profits to your
company resulting from the actions that you have taken either to acquire or not to acquire. Your
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final score will be based on the points resulting from your final decision plus one-half the average
points awarded based on all intermediate decisions.
While enough information within the information links will be presented to calculate this flow, it
is doubtful that you will have time to access all of the information and perform these calculations.
Thus, you must prioritize the information that you access. At the end of the experiment, the
individual with the greatest point total will be revealed to all participants and awarded a prize.
The first round of the experiment is a practice round. Point totals for this round will not count
toward the prize. When you are told “now”, please press the ‘START’ button and begin the practice
round. At the end of this round, please do not advance to the next round. After all have finished
the practice round, someone will answer any remaining questions that you may have.
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A.2 Sample Business Case - CEO Version
Merger Decision Making
MediProd, Inc. – CEO Version
You are the President and Chief Executive Officer of MediProd, Inc. It 
is late on Friday September 23, 2005 and you are sitting alone in your 
New York office considering a potential acquisition that would forever 
change your company. Your medical device manufacturing company 
is positioned to acquire a rival business, Smith Medical Devices. 
MediProd, with net sales of around $100 million, would be the 
acquiring firm. However, in actuality, this would be a "merger of 
equals" since Smith has net sales of around $90 million. 
There is a strategic fit between MediProd and Smith. Yet, you cannot 
ignore the other issues that have been the downfall of numerous other 
mergers. You are scheduled to make a recommendation to the board 
on Monday. The board members have their own varied opinions, but 
you know that they will go with your recommendation on whether or 
not to proceed with the merger. As you consider your options, you 
again review the relevant decision making information. 
Relevant Decision Making Information 
Time Remaining 
Final Decision
6:48
Smith Company 
Information
Integration Issues Legal and Regulatory
Market Information Tax Ramifications
Competition/Market
Share
Financials
MediProd Company 
Information
Operating Synergies
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Competition/Market Share
MediProd has three major competitors (Smith Medical Devices, MegaMed, and M&D, Inc.) all of
whom are very price competitive in order to grow their share positions in both the U.S. and the
European markets. Historically, the top 4 companies (MediProd, Smith, MegaMed, and M&D)
have controlled around 65% of the market with the remainder of the market share divided among
30 or so smaller manufacturers.
MediProd Financials
MediProd, Inc. - Selected Financial Data (dollars in thousands)
2004 2003 2002
Net Sales $101,675 $ 90,865 $ 86,090
Cost of Sales 63,136 55,954 56,203
Gross Profit 38,539 34,911 29,887
Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses 34,411 27,965 28,573
Operating Profit 4,128 6,946 1,314
Interest Income (Expense) (207) (4,436) 847
Other Income(Expense) (13) (103) 782
Income Tax Benefit (Expense) (2,320) (1,433) (809)
Net Income (Loss) $ 1,588 $ 974 $ 2,134
MediProd, Inc. - Balance Sheet at period end (dollars in thousands)
2004 2003
Cash and Cash Equivalents $1,959 $ 1,252
Other Assets 134,164 63,021
Total Assets 133,123 64,273
Total Debt 414 33,131
Other Liabilities 12,298 30,172
Total Liabilities 12,712 63,303
Shareholders’ Equity 123,411 970
Other MediProd, Inc. Financial Information
• MediProd intends to make the Smith acquisition by issuing stock.
• MediProd’s discount rate is 4%.
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Smith Financials
Smith Medical Devices - Selected Financial Data (dollars in thousands)
2004 2003
Net Sales $ 89,859 $ 80,981
Cost of Sales 59,335 50,026
Gross Profit 30,524 30,955
Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses 29,713 28,890
Operating Profit 811 2,065
Interest Income (Expense) (105) (999)
Other Income (Expense) (155) (262)
Income Tax Benefit (Expense) (703) (638)
Net Income (Loss) $(152) $ 166
Integration Issues
• The CEO of MediProd and Smith have completely opposite backgrounds and management
styles and their respective management teams reflect their different personalities. Since the
Smith CEO is not expected to retire, it is still unclear how the two groups would be integrated.
• While large yearly costs savings from the rationalized company are eventually expected, there
are significant one time integration costs that will be spread out over several years. These
costs are mainly concentrated in the following areas: IT, plant closures, severance.
Integration Costs
• IT - With sales forces dispersed across the globe, new IT systems will be needed to integrate
the sales teams to enable them to sell complete solutions. (estimated cost: $5,000,000)
• Plant closures - It is estimated that approximately 50% of the Smith manufacturing facilities
will need to be closed. (estimated cost: $2 million)
• Severance - An estimated 30% of the current Smith workforce will need to be laid off. (esti-
mated cost: $9 million - 300 @ $30,000 each)
• Other Merger Related Administrative Expenses (estimated cost: 1% of purchase price.)
Legal and Regulatory Considerations
An antitrust review indicates that there may be difficulty in avoiding a challenge during the Hart-
Scott-Rodino (HSR) filing process.
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Market Information
• MegaMed is a large competitor of MediProd. MegaMed recently acquired one of the smaller
(but very profitable) manufacturers of 1 times revenue ($10 million).
• M&D Inc. (with a similar financial profile to Smith) currently trades on the stock exchange
for a price which equates to 12 times revenue.
• The medical devices market is expected to grow by 4% over the next five years.
MediProd, Inc.Company Information
MediProd, Inc. designs and manufactures medical devices - syringe pumps, fluid & drug delivery
and respiratory products - used in the care and treatment of patients around the world. MediProd
offers solutions for the entire continuum of care, providing critical care systems and products to
hospitals, healthcare systems and alternate healthcare settings in more than 75 countries through
a global sales force and distribution network. In total, it manufactures and markets more than
2,000 products worldwide. Over the past 40 years the company has grown to over 1,000 employees.
MediProd’s current profitability strategy entails developing new products (i.e., recently introduced
new 24-guage catheter for the NICU), and decreasing manufacturing costs through a manufacturing
rationalization program.
Operating Synergies
• MediProd executives feel that the acquisition of Smith along with its vascular access product
line would enable MediProd to augment an already comprehensive product line with intra-
venous catheters. Ideally, this acquisition could position MediProd as one of the world’s
leading critical care companies which could enable the company to offer complete system
solutions to distributors, hospital and alternate care facilities.
• While there is a good deal of overlap in terms of facilities, Smith has some key manufacturing
plant locations that would greatly enhance MediProd’s current operations.
• Large yearly cost savings are expected.
Yearly Cost Savings
• Elimination of redundant management and staff (estimated savings: $6 million/year)
• Rationalization of manufacturing operations (estimated savings: $250,000/year)
• Closing of Smith’s back office operations (estimated savings of $100,000/year)
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Smith Medical Devices Company Information
Smith manufactures and markets around 1000 medical devices. However, the vascular access prod-
uct line comprises 75% of its business. Smith has approximately 900 employees worldwide, including
its own global sales force and distribution network. Smith would view this acquisition as a friendly
one. The possibility has been discussed and has the blessing of the board. The CEO of Smith, who
could best be described as your complete opposite in terms of personal background and manage-
ment style, is expected to retire if the merger goes through. However, the management team that
he has put in place over the past 15 years definitely reflects his personality.
Tax Ramifications
It is believed that there will not be any significant tax ramifications as a result of the merger.
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B Proof of Propositions
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1: Let s1 and s2 be two message services each with two possible messages: ν1h1 =
ν2h1 = pih, ν
2
h2 < ν
1
h2, and q
1
1 = q
1
2. Then, message service 1 will be weakly preferred to signal 2 if
ν1h2 <
1
2 and if
∂k(pih−ν)
∂ν is below a specified bound.
Using equation 5, let us consider V (s1)− V (s2). V (s1)− V (s2) can fall into three regimes.
I. If pih(ν
2
h2)
k2
pih(ν
2
h2)
k2+pil(1−ν2h2)k2
[U(Πh)− U(Πl)] +U(Πl), pih(ν
1
h2)
k1
pih(ν
1
h2)
k1+pil(1−ν1h2)k1
[U(Πh)− U(Πl)] +U(Πl) <
U(Π), so that the disconfirming signal from either message service leads the decision-maker to not
invest, then we have:
V (s1) = (1− q11)
[
U(Π)− pihU(Πh)− pilU(Πl)
]
V (s2) = (1− q12)
[
U(Π)− pihU(Πh)− pilU(Πl)
]
V (s1)− V (s2) = (q12 − q11)
[
U(Π)− pihU(Πh)− pilU(Πl)
]
= 0. (6)
II. If pih(ν
2
h2)
k2
pih(ν
2
h2)
k2+pil(1−ν2h2)k2
[U(Πh)− U(Πl)]+U(Πl) < U(Π) < pih(ν
1
h2)
k1
pih(ν
1
h2)
k1+pil(1−ν1h2)k1
[U(Πh)− U(Πl)]+
U(Πl), so that the individual will still choose to invest if the less disconfirming signal is received,
then we have:
V (s1) = (1− q11)
[
pih(ν1h2)
k
1
pih(ν1h2)
k
1 + pil(1− ν1h2)k1
[U(Πh)− U(Πl)] + U(Πl)− pihU(Πh)− pilU(Πl)
]
V (s2) = (1− q12)
[
U(Π)− pihU(Πh)− pilU(Πl)
]
.
Thus,
V (s1)− V (s2) = (1− q11)
[
pih(ν2h2)
k2
pih(ν2h2)
k2 + pil(1− ν2h2)k2
[U(Πh)− U(Πl)] + U(Πl)− U(Π)
]
> 0. (7)
III. If U(Π) < pih(ν
2
h2)
k2
pih(ν
2
h2)
k2+pil(1−ν2h2)k2
[U(Πh)− U(Πl)]+U(Πl) < pih(ν
1
h2)
k1
pih(ν
1
h2)
k1+pil(1−ν1h2)k1
[U(Πh)− U(Πl)]+
U(Πl), so that the individual will continue to invest no matter which signal is received, then we
have:
V (s1) = (1− q11)
[
pih(ν1h2)
k
1
pih(ν1h2)
k
1 + pil(1− ν1h2)k1
[U(Πh)− U(Πl)] + U(Πl)− pihU(Πh)− pilU(Πl)
]
V (s2) = (1− q12)
[
pih(ν1h2)
k
2
pih(ν1h2)
k
2 + pil(1− ν1h2)k2
[U(Πh)− U(Πl)] + U(Πl)− pihU(Πh)− pilU(Πl)
]
.
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Thus,
V (s1)− V (s2) = (1− q11) [U(Πh)− U(Πl)]
[
pih(ν1h2)
k1
pih(ν1h2)
k1 + pil(1− ν1h2)k1
− pih(ν
2
h2)
k2
pih(ν2h2)
k2 + pil(1− ν2h2)k2
]
. (8)
V (s1)− V (s2) ≥ 0 if
pih(ν1h2)
k1
pih(ν1h2)
k1 + pil(1− ν1h2)k1
− pih(ν
2
h2)
k2
pih(ν2h2)
k2 + pil(1− ν2h2)k2
≥ 0. (9)
If we define θ = k1 − k2 and τ = ν1h2 − ν2h2, then we can rewrite the left hand side of equation 9 as
C(τ, θ) =
pih(ν1h2)
k1
pih(ν1h2)
k1 + pil(1− ν1h2)k1
− pih(ν
1
h2 − τ)k1−θ
pih(ν1h2 − τ)k1−θ + pil(1− ν1h2 + τ)k1−θ
. (10)
Note that C(0, 0) = 0. Totally differentiating equation 10 with respect to τ and θ we can thus find
the set of τ and θ resulting in indifference between the two message services,
dθ
dτ
= − (k1−θ){2pih(ν1h2−τ)k1−θ−1+pil[(ν1h2−τ)−1(1−ν1h2+τ)k1−θ−(1−ν1h2+τ)k1−θ−1]}
pil(1−ν1h2+τ)k1−θ[ln(ν1h2−τ)−ln(1−ν1h2+τ)]
(11)
Additionally,
∂C
∂θ
=
pihpil(ν1h2 − τ)k1−θ(1− ν1h2 + τ)k1−θ[ln(ν1h2 − τ)− ln(1− ν1h2 + τ)]
[pih(ν1h2 − τ)k1−θ + pil(1− ν1h2 + τ)k1−θ]2
, (12)
which will be negative if ν1h2 <
1
2 .
Thus, equation 12 implies that V (s1) ≥ V (s2) will follow if
dθ
dτ
< −(k1 − θ)2pih(ν
1
h2 − τ)k1−θ−1 + pil[(ν1h2 − τ)−1(1− ν1h2 + τ)k1−θ − (1− nu1h2 + τ)k1−θ−1]
pil(1− ν1h2 + τ)k1−θ[ln(ν1h2 − τ)− ln(1− ν1h2 + τ)]
.(13)
Given equation 13 and using the implicit function theorem, it follows directly that:
∂k(pih − ν)
∂ν
< −(k1 − θ)2pih(ν
1
h2 − τ)k1−θ−1 + pil[(ν1h2 − τ)−1(1− ν1h2 + τ)k1−θ − (1− nu1h2 + τ)k1=θ−1]
pil(1− ν1h2 + τ)k1−θ[ln(ν1h2 − τ)− ln(1− ν1h2 + τ)]
(14)
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2: Let s1 and s2 be two message services each with two possible messages: ν1h1 =
ν2h1 = pih, ν
2
h2 < pih, and q
1
1 > q
1
2. Then, message service 1 will be strongly preferred to message
service 2.
Using equation 5, let us consider V (s1)− V (s2). V (s1)− V (s2) can fall under two regimes.
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I. If pih(νh2)
k2
pih(νh2)
k2+pil(1−νh2)k2 [U(Πh)− U(Πl)] + U(Πl) < U(Π), so that the individual does not invest
when the disconfirming signal is received, then we have:
V (s1) = (1− q11)
[
U(Π)− pihU(Πh)− pilU(Πl)
]
V (s2) = (1− q12)
[
U(Π)− pihU(Πh)− pilU(Πl)
]
.
Thus,
V (s1)− V (s2) = (q12 − q11)
[
U(Π)− pihU(Πh)− pilU(Πl)
]
> 0. (15)
II. If pih(νh2)
k2
pih(νh2)
k2+pil(1−νh2)k2 [U(Πh)− U(Πl)] + U(Πl) > U(Π), then we have:
V (s1) = (1− q11)
[
pih(νh2)k1
pih(νh2)k1 + pil(1− νh2)k1
[U(Πh)− U(Πl)] + U(Πl)− pihU(Πh)− pilU(Πl)
]
V (s2) = (1− q12)
[
pih(νh2)k2
pih(νh2)k2 + pil(1− νh2)k2
[U(Πh)− U(Πl)] + U(Πl)− pihU(Πh)− pilU(Πl)
]
.
Since k ∈ [0, 1], we can say that:
V (s1)− V (s2) = (q12 − q11)
[
pih(νh2)k2
pih(νh2)k2 + pil(1− νh2)k2 [U(Πh)− U(Πl)] + U(Πl)− pihU(Πh)− pilU(Πl)
]
> 0.(16)
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